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ABSTRACT
Since 1978 there has been a significant increase in the number of
high risk bond offerings. The shift to lower rated bonds introduces
a substantive challenge to the rating agencies. The shift to low rated
offerings was not observed in prior bond rating empirical studies.
This study uses an n-chotomous multivariate probit model with cash
based funds flow components and financial ratios to predict industrial
bond ratings. New and reclassified bond ratings by Moody's in 1983 are
used to predict 1984 ratings. Initially the classification and predic-
tive results were slightly lower than previous studies. A careful
analysis of the classification/prediction probability distributions
showed the results were close to being correct in a large number of
cases. A correct/close measure indicated the predictive accuracy of
the models to be substantially higher than initially observed. The
analysis found four funds flow components to be significant in pre-
dicting the bond ratings of reclassified issues. The significant com-
ponents were inventories, dividends, financing and fixed coverage
charges. Finally, the study highlights the complexity of the bond
rating process.

PREDICTING INDUSTRIAL BOND RATINGS WITH A
PROBIT MODEL AND FUND FLOW COMPONENTS
After surveying the empirical literature Lev [26] , Foster [15] and
Altman, Avery, Eisenbeis and Sinkey [1] concluded that decision makers
gained substantive insights from results that were generated by using
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accounting and financial information in multivariate models. In
synthesizng the literature the authors indicate that financial infor-
mation based models are useful in predicting corporate failure, bond
ratings and in classifying the credit riskiness of commercial bank
loans.
In the next few paragraphs our objective is to present key insights
and develop basic research issues that emerged from our review of the
literature on predicting bond ratings. It was apparent that the
accuracy of the previous models in classifying bond ratings for origi-
nal sample data was relatively high, but the prediction results were
markedly lower. Also we found most of the studies focused on pre-
dicting the ratings of new bond offerings. However, a few studies con-
centrated on the rating prediction of reclassified bond issues.
A critical finding was that the results of the prior studies were
all data dependent. That is each study was based on a different time
period and a unique set of ratios was used to predict bond ratings.
Ang and Patel [4] recognized the data dependent issue that results in
the inability to generalize the similarities and difference of the
empirical findings.
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Many of the empirical studies were based on the use of financial
ratios in a multiple discriminant analysis model (MDA) . The short-
comings encountered when using the MDA model with data that does not
meet its normality assumptions has been widely discussed by Eisenbeis
[12], Joy and Tollefson [23], Pinches [32, 33] and Altman, et al. [1].
In the model building/classification testing phase of many studies
there was a relatively high classification error in one or more of the
Moody rating categories of A, Baa, or Ba. Explaining the misclassif i-
cation phenomenon was a common thread found in many of the studies. Why
do the misclassif ications occur mainly in the A, Baa and Ba ratings?
In collecting the data we observed the researchers used a widely
accepted procedure of subdividing the bonds into either an investment
of a noninvestment grade. For most studies it appears the investment
grade bonds were primarily nonconvertible , nonsubordinated fixed income
securities and most of the noninvestment grade bonds were convertible,
subordinated securities. We found there were very few nonsubordinated,
nonconvertible bonds issued in the 1960s and 1970s. In trying to under-
stand the misclassif ication phenomenon of prior studies, a methodology
issue arises concerning the rating of convertible bonds vis-a-vis
straight fixed income bonds. For a company with both fixed income and
convertible debt outstanding, the convertible bonds are rated one class
below straight fixed income debt because of their subordinated nature,
Ritchie [43, p. 583], Although there may be a convertible bond effect
contributing to the misclassification phenomona in previous studies, we
raise the issue in order to sharpen the measurement process used in
this study.
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In 1978 the new issues bond market experienced an increased accep-
tance of nonconvertible, noninvestment grade bonds, commonly referred
to as high yield or junk bonds, Drexel Burnham Lambert [11],
Fitzpatrick and Severiens [14], Grant [19]. Because of this substan-
tive expansion of the junk bond market, which was not present in pre-
vious studies, important issues in this paper are to determine if
nonconvertible high yield bonds have an effect on the ability of the
model to predict bond ratings; and to discover if there exists a
separate convertible bond effect.
The empirical studies have relied almost exclusively on the use of
financial ratios in predicting bond ratings. In 1984 Gentry, Newbold
and Whitford [16, 17, 18] used cash based funds flow components in
logit, probit and MDA models to predict bankruptcy and gain unique
insight into the bankruptcy process. The dynamic capabilities of the
model makes it possible to measure the relative contribution and
stability of the cash inflow and outflow components. The information
contained in cash based flows is markedly different from the infor-
mation imbedded in stock based financial ratios. The former model
records the total flow of cash throughout the firm and provides
diagnostic information for measuring the financial performance of man-
agement. Because the components of the model are always the same, it is
unnecessary to determine which set of ratios best fit the data. There-
fore, always having the same set of cash based components for each
study overcomes a basic shortcoming of previous bond rating empirical
analysis, when a unique set of ratios was obtained for each study.
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A primary objective of this study is to use cash based funds flow
components to classify and predict industrial bond ratings for both
new offerings and reclassified issues. In Section I we review briefly
the main stream findings in the bond rating literature and develop a
historical overview of bond market offerings. An explanation of the
funds flow model is presented in Section II. The selection of the
sample companies that offered new debt or whose bond ratings were
changed are presented in section III. Finally, in Section IV the
empirical results from the probit models are analyzed and Section V
develops the major conclusions of the study.
I. OVERVIEW
Literature
There has been an evolution of statistical models used to predict
bond ratings and risk premium. The early studies in the 1950s and
1960s relied on financial ratios and multiple regression analysis,
e.g., Fisher [13], Pogue and Soldofsky [40], Horrigan [22] and West
[46]. Since the 1970s linear or quadratic MDA models combined with
financial ratios were used to predict bond ratings, e.g., Pinches and
Mingo [36], Altman and Katz [3], Bhandari , Soldofsky and Boe [8],
Belkaoui [6, 7], and Peavy and Edgar [30, 31]. In the late 1970s and
early 1980s probit was used by Kaplan and Urwitz [24] and Wingler and
Watts [49] to predict bond ratings.
Although each study used different sample companies, time periods
and ratios, the accuracy of the models in classifying new bond ratings
ranged from approximately 65 percent to 75 percent for a broad based
sample of industrial companies, i.e., Pinches and Mingo [37], Kaplan
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and Urwitz [24], Belkaoui [6, 7] and 85 percent accuracy for Pogue and
Soldofsky [40]. For a sample of new public utility offerings, Altman
and Katz [3] achieved a 91 percent classification accuracy, while
Bhandari, Soldofsky and Boe [8] and Wingler and Watts [49] achieved a
65 to 75 percent classification accuracy. For reclassified issues the
measurement of success ranged from 66 percent for Horrigan [22] to 69.8
percent for Bhandari, Soldofsky and Boe [8].
The time period used for collecting the financial ratio infor-
mation to build the models ranged from 1961-1964 for Horrigan [22] and
1961-1966 for Pogue and Soldofsky [40] to 1981 for Belkaoui [7].
Several of the studies used data from the period 1967-1978, e.g.,
Pinches and Mingo (1967-1968), Kaplan and Urwitz (1970-1974), Bhandari,
Soldofsky and Boe (1972-1976), Pinches, Singleton and Jahankani (1975),
Wingler and Watts (1969-1976) and Belkaoui (1978). Belkaoui [7] used
data for the period 1980 and 1981.
Using the coefficients from the original model to predict ratings
in a different time period is the acid test of a model's prediction
ability. Studies that used this approach were Horrigan [22] , Pinches
and Mingo [37] and Belkaoui [7]. The success rate for predicting bond
ratings ranged from 56 percent to 64 percent for the three previously
mentioned studies. The reason the predictive results are lower than
the classification model has been questioned by each of the authors.
The instability of the bond ratings between the classification and
prediction periods has been raised as a possible reason that predic-
tive results are less accurate than the classification results.
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Stabillty of Bond Offerings
Models for predicting bond ratings in year t are built on financial
information acquired from companies rated in year t-1. Statistical
models assume the distribution of the bond ratings remain relatively
stable between year t-1 and t. Panel A in Table 1 shows the deteriora-
tion in credit ratings for outstanding straight publicly offered cor-
porate bonds between 1973 and 1983. In 1973 22.9 percent of the
outstanding debt was rated AAA, while in 1983 only 10.6 percent was
rated AAA. AA rated bonds increased from 28.5 of the total in 1973 to
31.6 percent in 1983. The A rated debt declined from 28.9 percent of
the total in 1973 to 25.6 percent in 1983. The proportion of BBB rated
bonds increased from 10.5 percent of total debt outstanding to 17.7
percent between 1973 and 1983 and other (high yield) debt increased
from 9.3 percent of the total to 14.5 percent. Panel B in Table 1
shows that the distribution of industrial bonds shifted to lower
ratings between 1981 and 1984. In 1981 26.5 percent of the industrial
bonds outstanding were rated BBB or lower while in 1984 41 percent
were rated BBB or lower.
A second test of the stability of industrial bond ratings is the
distribution of new offerings among Moody's six rating classes. For
each year during the period 1965-1984 the number of new industrial
fixed income bonds rated in each risk category are presented in Table
2 and the number of new convertible bond offerings are in Table 3.
It is apparent that the absolute number and relative proportions of new
issues in each risk, class varied widely from year to year. In 1978
Table 2 shows there was a significant increase in the number of Ba and
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B rated nonconvertible bonds. Prior to 1978 there were very few issues
in the Ba and B rating classes. Also, Table 3 shows the high propor-
tion of convertible bonds that were rated Ba and B during the period
1965 to 1972. During the period 1972-1979 there were very few conver-
tible bonds offered in the market. However, in 1980 the demand for
convertible bonds increased sharply, and it continued through 1984.
Many of the previous bond rating studies used new bond offering
information from the period 1965 to 1978 when the preponderance of Ba
and B rated issues were convertible subordinated bonds. During this
period rating agencies usually rated subordinated convertible issues
one class lower than a straight fixed income bond. That is, a company
with outstanding debt rated Baa by Moody's would more than likely have
a new subordinated convertible rated Ba. Thus for the companies
included in previous studies that offered subordinated convertibles, it
is likely they were underrated by one risk class. A portion of the
misclassification of A, Baa, and Ba bond ratings in previous studies
may have been related to the underrating of the companies that offered
subordinated convertible bonds.
The size of the market for high yield bonds has grown rapidly
since 1978. The significance of the investment opportunities in the
low rated bonds has been recognized by Blume and Keim [9] , Fitzpatrick
and Severiens [14] , Drexel Burnham Lambert [11] , Sorenson [44] , Altman
and Nanmacher [2], Table 4 presents the trend of new high yield
issues for the period 1977 to 1984. New high yield issues raised $0.55
billion in 1977 and reached a high of $14.2 billion in 1984, which
represents approximately 25 percent ($14.2/$56.2) of new public
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straight bond issues in 1984. In the empirical analysis the straight
Ba and B rated bonds are analyzed separately from the new convertible
bonds
.
The instability of the demand for debt capital by industry sector
is frequently cited as a reason the prediction of bond ratings are
substantially lower than the classification test results. To observe
the stability of demand for new debt among the several industries, over
time, Table 5 presents at twenty year history of gross proceeds from
primary nonconvertible bond offerings by major industry sector. It is
apparent that there is only limited stability in the new debt offerings
of an industry. For example in 1965, the manufacturing sector raised
$4.2 billion which represented 36 percent of total debt offerings.
Since 1980 the manufacturing sector composed less than 25 percent of
the total. In contrast, between 1965 and 1972 finance and real estate
combined represented between 6 and 11 percent of the total, but by 1984
it represented over 50 percent of total debt offerings.
The preceding overview shows there are a variety of reasons that
prediction model results underperform the classification model perfor-
mance results. The overview provides a base for interpreting the
classification and prediction results for the forthcoming analysis.
II. THE MODEL
Rationale
In an accounting context, cash inflows equal cash outflows. The
level and speed of the cash flows reflect managements' operating,
investment and financing decisions. The distributions of the com-
ponents generating cash inflows and outflows are signals that reflect
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the resource allocation decisions of management. The trends of the
changes in cash inflow and outflow components provide measures for
discriminating between bond rating classes.
Components
The model we use to identify funds flow measures was developed by
Erich Helfert [21]. After extensive use of Helfert's model, we rede-
signed it to have eight major components [16]. The eight net funds
flow components are operations (NOFF), working capital (NWCFF) , finan-
cial (NFFF), fixed coverage expenses, i.e., interest and lease
payments (FCE), capital expenditures (NIFF), dividends (DIV), other
asset and liability flows (NOTHER) and the change in cash and market-
able securities (CC). The interrelationship among the components is
quite complex. Excepting changes in cash and marketable securities, a
source (S) would be a positive number and a use (U) would be negative.
As a first cut, the following equation presents a formulation of the
cash based funds flow model and the most likely source/use classifica-
tion of each component for a financially healthy firm.
NOFF + NWCFF + NFFF + FCE + NIFF + DIV + NOTHER - CC =
+ 0- +---- +
(S) (U) (S) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)
The accounting convention underlying the funds statement results
in total net inflow of funds (TNIF) being equal to the absolute value
of total net outflow of funds (TNOF). We have simplified the notation
by substituting the expression total net cash flow (TNCF) for TNIF and
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TNOF. Thus by dividing each funds flow component by TNCF, one can
determine the percentage each component contributes to the total.
Research Study
Our analysis uses 12 funds flow measures to classify failed and
nonfailed companies. We substituted the five working capital com-
ponents for the single net working capital component, omitted the com-
ponent CC/TNF to avoid a statistical problem of overidentif ication and
added a size measure, total net flows as a percentage of total assets
(TNCF/TA) [17, 18]
.
II. SAMPLE SELECTION
Moody's bond ratings were acquired for all industrial bond offerings
for 1983 and 1984. There were 127 new issues in 1983 and 155 in 1984.
Additionally all industrial bonds that were reclassified in either 1983
or 1984 were also included in the sample. Next we determined if two
years of complete company financial information was available on the
Compustat industrial tapes in order to compute funds flow components
and financial ratios. There was complete financial information on 64
new issues in 1983 and 61 new issues in 1984 as shown in Table 6.
Complete financial data was available for 37 issues that were
reclassified in 1983 and complete data for 44 issues reclassified in
1984. Table 7 presents these data.
The sample data are presented in five classes of Moody's ratings
that range from Aa to B in Tables 6 and 7 . Because there were only six
Aaa rated bonds with available data for 1983 and 1984, the Aaa bonds
were not included in the sample. The distribution of the ratings in
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1984 are markedly different from the 1983 ratings. That is 65.6 per-
cent of 1984 sample bonds are rated A or higher, while 51.6 percent of
the 1983 sample bonds are rated A or higher. Additionally, in 1984 13
percent were rated Baa compared to 25 percent Baa ratings in 1983.
IV. ANALYSIS
An n-chotomous multivariate probit model developed by McKelvey and
Zavonis [27] , and used by Kaplan and Urwitz [24] , was utilized with the
thirteen funds flow components to model the 1983 Moody's bond classifi-
cation process. The coefficients from the model were used to predict
the 1984 bond ratings. One model classified the new bond issues and a
separate model focused on the bonds that were reclassified. Further-
more, the six measures from Pinches and Mingo (PM) [37] were adopted to
determine the contribution of financial ratios in classifying and pre-
dicting bond ratings in 1983 and 1984. The six measures were: (1)
subordination, (2) amount of the issue in dollars, (3) debt ratio, (4)
cumulative years that dividends were paid, (5) net income/total asset
(NI/TA), and (6) net income/ interest.
3 We adopted the PM variables
rather than try to select sample dependent ratios for this comparative
segment of the paper.
The empirical analysis will classify the bond ratings with three
separate sets of financial information. One based on cash flow
information—the thirteen funds flow components; another based on
static financial information—PM's six measures; and combining the
funds flow components with the PM measures. By using three separate
sets of financial information, it is possible to determine the relative
contribution of each one in the predictions of 1984 bond ratings. In
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deterraining if the convertible and subordinate issues were significant
in classifying and predicting the bond ratings, a dummy variable was
included for each variable. A comparison of the ratings of the
outstanding regular debt to the ratings of new convertibles revealed
that in only one company was the regular bond rating close to one
rating higher than the convertible issue. That was the Singer Company
where the regular debt was rated Ba2 and the convertible was rated Bl.
In 1983 there were two issues where the regular bond and the conver-
tible issue were rated the same and in 1984 three issues had the same
rating for the regular debt and the convertible issue. In the
remaining cases, one in 1983 and five in 1984 the rating difference was
only one subclass lower, e.g., Baal for the regular debt and Baa2 for
the convertible. Thus the concern of the downrating of the convertible
bonds is prior empirical studies is not an issue in this study. The
convertible dummy was excluded from the analysis, but the subordination
dummy remains
.
Classification Results
When using the funds flow components to classify the 1983 new bond
issues, Table 8 shows approximately 59 percent (38/64) of the bond
ratings were classified correctly. PM's ratios correctly classifyed 64
percent (41/64) of the new issues and when the two were combined they
correctly classify 72 percent (46/64) of the new issues. The funds
flow components and PM's ratios correctly classified 59 percent (22/37)
of the bonds that were reclassified in 1983. When these two measures
were combined, they correctly classified 65 percent (24/37) of the
revised issues. When the revised and new issues were combined, Table 8
-13-
shows the classification results were sightly lower than when the two
issues were analyzed separately. The classification results for the
new issues are similar to but slightly lower than previous studies.
The probit coefficients generated by the three sets of financial -
information are presented in Table 9. When the funds flow components
were used to classify the new bond issues, none were statistically
significant. However, three of PMs static measures were significant
for the same test. They were the total dollar amount of the bond
issue, cumulative years in which dividends had been paid, and rate of
return on assets. When the two sets of information are combined only
the dollar amount of the issue and the cumulative years of dividends
were significant in classifying new bond issues.
When classifying the bonds that were revised in 1983 Table 9 shows
four of the funds flow components were statistically significant.
These flow components were inventories, financing, fixed coverage
expenditures and dividends. An interpretation of each of the signifi-
cant components provides insight to the bond rating process. The
higher the percent of total outflow going to inventories the higher the
bond rating. The higher flow to inventories signals demand for the
products and continued growth. The lower the percentages of inflows
from long-term financing sources, the lower the financing risk, and the
higher the bond rating. The higher the percentage of outflow going to
fixed coverage the lower the rating. Finally, the higher the percentage
of total outflow going to dividends, the higher the bond rating. The
dividends are the theoretical base for value, thus the higher the per-
centage of total outflow going to dividends the higher the potential
value of the firm.
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The probit model identifies two ratios—the debt ratio and the rate
of return on total assets—as being significant in classifying the
revised bond ratings. When the financial information is combined the
subordination variable was significant, as well as the inventory flow
component and the financing component.
Prediction Results
The probit model coefficients were used to predict the 1984
results. Table 8 shows the 1983 funds flow components correctly pre-
dicted only 47.5 percent (28/61) of the 1984 new bond ratings, while
the ratios predicted 57.4 percent (35/61) of the new issues ratings.
When the ratios and flows were combined, 47.5 percent (28/61) of the
new issue ratings in 1984 were correctly predicted. Th<j. prediction
results of the reclassified issues were less successful than the new
issues. These data are reported in Table 8.
At first blush the prediction results are disappoint Lag, but a
close inspection of the probit rating predictions shows that a high
percentage of the misclassif Led/mispredicted bond ratings are extremely
close to the actual ratings. The probit model provides the probability
of the bond being classified in each of the five categories. Generally
the probabilities fall in three classes, e.g., Aa—31%, A—52% and
Baa—17%. In the example the predicted bond rating would be an A. If
the actual rating was an A, the model correctly predicted the rating.
If however, the actual rating was a Aa the bond rating would be mis-
predicted, but the predicted A rating is closer to the Aa than the Baa
rating. By analyzing the probability distributions for each rating it
is possible to determine (1) the number of correct classifications for
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the 1983 bond ratings and the correct predictions for the 1984 bond
ratings; (2) the number of 1983 classifications and 1984 predictions
that are on the correct side of the probability distribution of the
ratings. We label the last group as close.
Using the 1983 bond ratings and the funds flow components the pro-
bit model correctly classified 38 new issues and is close on 20 of the
64 new offerings. When the two classifications are combined, the model
correctly classifies or is close in classifying 90.6 percent of the new
issues. These results are shown in Table 10. For the 1984 new bond
ratings; 29 of the predictions are correct and 20 of the 61 new bond
ratings are close for a total of approximately 80 percent correct/close
predictions. For the combined financial information the 1983 new bond
rating classification results are 92 percent for the correct/close
measure compared to ony 7 2 percent being correct. The correct/close
prediction percentage is 77 percent compared to only 48 percent being
correct. All of these results are found in Table 10.
The classification/prediction results for the reclassified bond
issues are also markedly different from the model that measured only
the correct results. The reclassified issues are subdivided into
upgraded and downgraded issues. The funds flow components classify 86
percent of the upgrades as correct/close, while 96 percent of the down-
grades are either correct or close. The results are presented in Table
11. The ratios have similar classification results for the upgraded
issues and 100 percent for the downgraded issues . The combined finan-
cial information have correct/close classification results identical to
the funds flow components.
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The correct/close 1984 prediction results are 77 percent for the
funds flow components for both upgraded and downgraded issues, while
the ratio results are 68 percent for the upgrades and 82 percent for
the downgrades. When the ratio and funds flow components are combined,
the correct/close results are 73 percent for the upgrades and only 50
percent for the downgraded issues. Table 11 presents these results.
Log Likelihood Test—New Issues
The change in the log likelihood statistic from the probit analysis
serves as the basis for measuring the significance of the contribution
of funds flow components vis-a-vis financial ratios in classifying bond
ratings. The first test uses only the intercept to classify the sample
companies. The objective of initially using only the intercept to
classify the sample companies is to establish a standard for comparing
the change in the likelihood statistic when ratios and fund flow com-
ponents are added ' separately . The log of the likelihood function sta-
tistic for test 1, intercept only, is -141.83 and is reported in Table
12.
The second test adds six financial ratios to the probit analysis.
When the six ratios for test 2 are added, the likelihood statistic
drops to -54.00 as reported in Table 12. A Chi Square test of the
change in the likelihood statistic from -141.83 to -54.00 is signifi-
cant at the .01 level of confidence.
The third test adds the thirteen funds flow components to the
intercept in classifying the sample companies. The log of the likeli-
hood statistic is -58.17 compared to -141.83 with the intercept only.
The Chi Square statistic shows the addition of the thirteen funds flow
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components make a significant contribution in classifying the sample
companies at the .01 level of confidence. The implication of tests 2
and 3 are that separately financial ratios and funds flow components
contribute information that significantly improves the classification
of the bond ratings of new issues.
Test 4 combines thirteen funds flow components with the six finan-
cial ratios in the probit analysis. When the ratios are combined with
the thirteen funds flow measures in the probit analysis , the log of the
likelihood statistic is -46.32, as shown in Table 12. In measuring the
marginal contribution of adding six ratios to the thirteen funds flow
components in test 4, the Chi Square results show the change in the
likelihood statistic from -54.00 to -46.32 is not statistically signi-
ficant at the 5 percent level. When the thirteen funds flow components
are combined with six ratios, the marginal contribution to the likeli-
hood statistic is not statistically significant at -58.17 to -46.32.
Thus, combing the funds flows and ratios does not provide additional
statistically significant discriminating information in classifying
bond ratings.
Log Likelihood Tests—Reclassified Issues
The same set of tests are completed for the reclassified bond
issues. The log likelihood results are reported in Table 12. For test
6 when the ratios are added to the intercept, the Chi Square test of
the change in the likelihood statistic from -77.51 to -39.43 is signi-
ficant at the .01 level of confidence.
The seventh test adds the thirteen funds flow components to the
intercept in classifying the companies. The log of the likelihood
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statistic is -34.20 compared to -77.51 with the intercept only. The
Chi Square statistic shows the addition of the funds flow component
makes a significant contribution in classifying the 37 bond issues
whose ratings were reclassified. When the two sets of financial infor-
mation are combined, the marginal contribution of adding the ratios to
the funds flow components or vice versa does not provide additional
,
statistically significant information for classifying the ratings of
the reclassified bond issues. In summary, financial ratios and funds
flow components contribute information separately that significantly
improves the classification of the reclassified bond ratings, but
jointly they do not improve the classification ability of the probit
model
.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The log likelihood tests showed both ratios and funds flow com-
ponents contributed information that significantly improved the ability
of the n-chotomous multivariate probit model to classify new and
revised bond ratings. The prediction results of the ratios and funds
flow measures were moderately lower than results from previous studies.
However, when the correct/close prediction results were determined, the
model was found to be substantially better than its original performance
indicated. Secondly, the ratios provided slightly higher prediction
results than the funds flow components.
The predictive success of the model was lower than in previous
studies for several reasons. First, there was a substantial increase
in the noninvestment grade bond issues in 1983 and 1984 in comparison
to previous studies that used bond ratings for the 1967-1978 period.
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The shift to higher risk issues in the 1980s results in higher variance
of the financial information which makes the modeling process more dif-
ficult. This higher instability of the financial information results
in greater difficulty in predicting bond ratings.
Second, the distribution of the new bond offerings in 1984 were
markedly different from the 1983 new issues. The 1984 offerings were
more concentrated in the higher rated issues than the 1983 new issues.
Thus the probit classification model was based on 1983 financial infor-
mation of companies that had higher financial and business risk than
the companies whose 1984 bond ratings were being predicted. This phe-
nomenon is not new, but tends to lower the predictive success of the
model.
The funds flow components provided unique insight concerning the
rating prediction of reclassified bond issues. The n probit model indi-
cated bond ratings were higher when the percentage outflow of funds to
inventories and dividends was high, the percentage outflow of funds to
fixed coverage expenditures was low, and the percentage inflow of
funds from long-term, external financing sources was small.
This study illustrates the complexity of predicting bond ratings
and how the information in the system has changed dramatically since
1978. The shift in the distribution of new bond offerings to riskier
issues has increased the difficulty in determining bond ratings.
Adding the refinement of 1, 2 or 3 to each of the ratings has increased
the nuances in the complexity of the rating process. Finally, it is
apparent that the complexity of the rating process limits the predic-
tive accuracy of financial information based models.
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Footnotes
The authors express their appreciation to Hei Wai Lee, a graduate
student at the University of Illinois, for his computer expertise and
assistance and to Professor Michael Dugan for his programming advice.
2
Kaplan and Urwitz [24] and Belkaoui [7] also provide an extensive
review of the literature.
3
The methodology used by PM [37, p. 6] in determining each variable
was repeated in this study.
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TABLE 1
Credit Rating of the Outstanding Secondary Market
In Straight Publicly Offered Corporate Bonds
Panel A
(in percent)
Credit
Rating 1983 1978 1973
AAA 10.6 23.4 22.9
AA 31.6 27.6 28.5
A 25.6 33.2 28.9
BBB 17.7 10.7 10.5
Other 14.5 5.1 9.3
2
Panel B
Credit Rating for Outstanding Industrial Bonds
1981-1984
(in percent)
Credit
Rating 1984 1983 1982 1981
AAA 5.9 8.5 9.3 10.2
AA 27.2 26.8 27.4 28.0
A 25.9 26.1 32.2 35.3
BBB 14.6 15.5 10.4 5.9
Other 26.4 23.0 19.6 20.6
James McKeon. "A Decade of Change, 1973-1983: Heavy Retirements
Help Restructure Corporate Bond Market Anatomy." Memorandum to Port-
folio Managers
,
Salomon Brothers, May 1, 1984, p. 4.
2
James McKeon and Nancy Kimelman. 'The Anatomy of the Secondary
Market in Corporate Bonds, Year-End 1983 Update." Memorandum to
Portfolio Managers
,
Salomon Brothers, May 1, 1984, p. 3.
TABLE 2
Number of New Industrial Fixed Income Issues
Rated By Moody's, 1965-1984 1
Fixed Industrial Bonds
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Aaa — 3 5 3 6 4 7
Aa 1 5 12 5 11 11 11
A 8 10 29 9 6 47 39
Baa 7 8 14 6 3 17 21
Ba 2 - 3 6 7 5 5
B 3 2 - 9 1 - 3
Caa
Total 21 28 63 38 34 ~84 86
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Aaa 2 _ 7 10 2 3 2
Aa 4 4 17 22 11 7 4
A 9 9 30 54 22 6 8
Baa 13 4 1 7 4 9 5
Ba 1 4 1 1 - 2 9
B 2 1 - - - 9 29
Caa - - - - - - -
Total 31 22 56 94 39 36 57
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Aaa 5 5 7 3 3 6
Aa 14 19 13 18 14 15
A 14 47 29 51 18 34
Baa 5 12 4 11 17 12
Ba 7 7 5 7 4 16
B 23 27 19 19 31 50
Caa - - - - 1 1
Total 68 117 77 109 88 134
1
Moody's Bond Surveys
,
1965-1974.
TABLE 3
Number of New Industrial Convertible Issues
,
Rated by Moody's, 1965-1984 1
Convertible Bond Issues
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Aaa - - - - - - -
Aa - - - - 1 - 1
A - - 1 1 - 1 -
Baa - 2 11 7 5 3 4
Ba 14 13 45 25 34 9 21
B 16 14 42 42 33 11 9
Caa - - - - - - -
Total 30 29 99 75 73 24 35
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Aaa
Aa
A
- - - - - - -
1 — 1 — 2 1 -
Baa 2 - 1 8 2 - -
Ba 10 1 2 - 2 - 4
B 6 1 - - 3 - 2
Caa - - - - 1 - -
Total 21 2 4 8 10 1 6
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Aaa - - 1 1 - 1
Aa - - 1 1 - -
A 1 1 5 1 5 4
Baa 1 6 5 5 7 8
Ba 2 17 14 7 9 3
B 1 13 21 10 18 5
Caa - - - - - -
Total 5 37 49 25 39 21
Moody's Bond Surveys , 1965-1984.
TABLE 4
High Yield Bond Issues
1977-1984 1
(in $billion)
New Exchange
Issues Offerings Utilities
$ .55 .50 .01
1.45 .68 .00
1.30 .30 .09
1.27 .68 .11
1.30 .32 .04
2.51 .53 .14
7.52 .49 .48
14.21 .70 .87
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Total 30.19 4.20 1.74
Drexel Burnham Lambert, "The Case for High Yield Bonds, March
1985, p. 3.
TABLE 5
Gross Proceeds from Primary Non-Convertible Bond Offerings,
For Major Industries 1 1965-1981 and Public Offerings 1981-1984 2
(in billion. or dollars)
Financial and
Real Estate
% of
Annual
$ Total
Electric,
Manufac- Gas and
turing Water Communi.cations
% of % of % of
Annual Annual Annual
Year Business $ Total $ Total $ Total
1965 11.6 4.2 36 2.3 20 .8 .7
1966 13.1 4.9 37 3.0 23 1.8 14
1967 16.8 7.2 43 4.2 25 1.7 10
1968 13.8 4.3 31 4.3 31 1.6 12
1969 13.7 2.7 20 5.4 39 1.9 14
1970 26.5 8.4 32
'
7.9 30 4.9 18
1971 26.4 8.1 31 7.5 28 4.2 16
1972 23.5 4.1 17 6.3 27 3.6 15
1973 20.1 4.1 20 5.6 28 3.5 17
1974 31.0 9.6 31 8.9 29 3.7 12
1975 41.5 6.2 39 9.6 23 3.4 8
1976 41.2 2.5 30 8.3 20 2.8 7
1977 41.4 1.9 29 7.6 18 3.1 7
1978 37.0 9.5 26 7.0 19 3.3 9
1979 39.9 9.6 24 8.3 21 4.2 10
1980 51.6 5.0 29 9.4 18 6.7 13
1981 41.3 0.2 25 8.8 21 4.2 10
1982 41.7 9.7 23 9.1 22 1.1 3
1983 43.4 6.8 16 6.8 16 3.3 8
1984 56.2 9.7 17 5.6 10 1.4 2
1.3 11
1.1 8
.8 10
.9 6
.9 6
1.9 7
3.0 11
5.1 22
4.0 20
4.8 15
5.0 12
7.2 17
9.6 23
7.4 20
8.7 22
10.9 21
10.5 25
14.4 34
19.3 44
28.8 51
The industries not included are Extractive, Transportation, Sales
and Consumer Finance, Commercial and Other. The percentages do not
sum to 100 percent because these industries provide the balancing
entry.
2
Source: SEC Monthly Statistical Review
,
U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 1976, 1981, 1985.
TABLE 6
Number of New Regular and Convertible Issues,
Either Subordinated or Nonsubordinated,
by Rating Class for 1983 and 1984
1983
Regul ar Convert ible % of
Nonsub. Sub. Nonsub. Sub. Total Total
AA 14 - — - 14 21.9
A 18 - 1 - 19 29.7
Baa 11 2 - 3 16 25.0
Ba *- 2 - 5 7 10.9
B
43
2
6 ~T
6
14
8
64
12.5
100.0
1984
Strai.ght Convertible % of
Nonsub. Sub. Nonsub. Sub. Total Total
AA 15 — — - 15 24.6
A 22 - 1 2 25 41.0
Baa 7 - - 1 8 13.1
Ba 3 2 - - 5 8.2
B 1 6 - 1 8 13.1
48 8 1 4 61 100.0
TABLE 7
Number of New Regular and Convertible Issues,
Either Subordinated or Nonsubordinated,
by Moody's Rating Class for 1983 and 1984
1983
Rating Regular Convert:Lble % of
Class Nonsub. Sub. Nonsub. Sub. Total Total
AA 5 - - - 5 13.5
A 12 - - - 12 32.5
Baa 10 2 - 1 13 35.1
Ba 3 1 - - 4 10.8
B
30
1 _
4
1
1
1
2
3
37
8.1
100.0
1984
Regvjilar Conve rtible % of
Nonsub. Sub. Nonsub. Sub. Total Total
AA 5 — — — 5 11.4
A 12 - - 1 13 29.5
Baa 11 2 - 3 16 36.4
Ba 2 3 - 2 7 15.9
B
30
2
7
— 1
7
3
44
6.8
100.0
TABLE 8
The Percentage of the Bond Ratings
Classified and Predicted Correctly
Combination
of Ratios and
Funds Flow
Classification of 1983 Issues
Revised New Revised and New
Issues Issues Issues Combined
Sample Size (N) 37 64 101
Ratios 59.46 64.06 59.41
Funds Flow
Components 59.46 59.38 56.44
64.87 71.88 60.40
Sample Size (N)
Ratios
Funds Flow
Components
Both Ratios and
Funds Flows
Prediction of 1984 Ratings
44 61
36.36 57.38
29.54
22.73
47.54
49.54
105
49.52
36.19
39.05
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TABLE 10
Classification and Prediction Results of
New Offerings, 1983 and 1984
Number
Correct
Incorrect
,
but Close Total
% of Total
Correct or
Close
Ratios
1983 41 18 64 92.2
1984 35 18 61 86.9
Funds Flow
1983 38 20 64 90.6
1984 29 20 61 80.3
Combined
1983 46 13 64 92.2
1984 29 18 61 77.0
TABLE 11
Classification and Prediction Results of
Rating Upgrades and Downgrades, 1983 and 1984
Number of Upgrades
—
Number of Downgrades
—
% of Total % of Total
Correct Correct
Correct Close Total or Close Correct Close Total or Close
Ratios
1983 9 3 14 85.7 13 10 23 100.0
1984 8 7 22 68.2 7 11 22 81.8
Funds Flows
1983 9 3 14 85.7 13 9 23 95.6
1984 9 8 22 77.3 5 12 22 77.3
Combined
1983 8 12 14 85.7 16 6 23 95.6
1984 4 12 22 72.7 6 5 22 50.0
TABLE 12
LOG LIKELIHOOD RESULTS
Test NEW Issues Log of Likelihood
Number Tests Functions
1 Intercept Only -141.83
2 Six Financial Ratios -54.00
3 Thirteen Fund Flow Components -58.17
4 Combined Ratios and Flows -46.32
RECLASSIFIED Issues
5 Intercept Only -77.51
6 Six Financial Ratios -39.43
7 Thirteen Funds Flow Components -34.20
8 Combined Ratios and Flows -32.23
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